The Pacific Islands Forum and its powerful ‘partners’

The Pacific Islands Forum is often described as the region’s premier political gathering. But it has never been a space owned solely by Pacific nations. From the beginning, Australia and New Zealand have sat at the table — not so much as equals, but as “partners” with the power and resources to actively shape the agenda. Pacific analyst Sione Tekiteki explains.

 

Every year, the Pacific Islands Forum invites its 21 “dialogue partners” to attend its annual leaders meeting. These partners include colonial powers like the US and France, the EU, and rising superpowers China and India, among many others.

But this year’s leaders meeting, held next week in the Solomon Islands capital Honiara, will go ahead without them — and that’s led to accusations that partners are being “shut out”.

Although Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele has said the partners’ dialogue is simply being postponed and will be held at a later date, the controversy has looked like another flare-up in the Taiwan-China contest.

The real issue is the perception that pressure from China had pushed the move. Many partners voiced their disappointment. Some Pacific leaders did too — though whether that was genuine concern or simply to appease certain partners is another question.

But the idea that partners are being shut out of the Pacific Islands Forum is misleading.

At its core, the Pacific Islands Forum is a gathering of 16 Pacific states and territories, alongside two metropolitan members: Australia and New Zealand.

Technically, they’re full members. But, in practice, their size, foreign policy reach and legacy make them more akin to the Forum’s “dialogue partners”.

They provide aid, technical support, and act as the de facto guarantor of security and development arrangements. They even frame their participation in the Forum in the language of partnership — a word that glosses over the power imbalance.

For instance, after last month’s Forum foreign ministers meeting in Suva, Winston Peters said Aotearoa’s bid to host the 2027 Pacific Islands Forum meeting shows its intention to be a “partner of choice” in the Pacific. The same phrase is now standard jargon for Penny Wong and the Australian government.

This reality shapes Pacific politics. But it also exposes the absence of a genuine regional space for Pacific nations to meet among themselves.

No Pacific-only platform

While the Pacific Islands Forum is often described as the region’s premier political gathering, it has never been a space owned solely by Pacific nations.

Within the Forum, the label “Forum Island Countries”, referring to the 14 independent Pacific states, has appeared in Forum communiqués as a way of distinguishing them from Australia and New Zealand. But this is in name only — it’s not an institutional reality.

Every major regional institution in the region includes metropolitan members in some form, reflecting the region’s colonial legacy and funding realities. That means partner influence is embedded everywhere. There is no Pacific-only forum where states can deliberate without partners in the room.

The closest thing is the Pacific SIDS (small island developing states) group — 14 UN-recognised Pacific nations that work as a bloc in global settings. But within the region itself, there is no equivalent.

The partnership mechanism

At next week’s meeting, leaders will also take up the review of regional architecture — essentially, how the region should organise itself, politically and structurally.

At the centre is a proposed “partnership mechanism” to manage the growing number of external players wanting to engage with the region. Given the overwhelming number of strategic interests, small administrations struggle to keep up partner engagement — and so does the Forum with its 21 partners.

The current idea is to divide partners into two tiers, giving the top tier greater access to Pacific leaders. But talks have stalled, and even a modest decision in Honiara would be significant.

The sensitivities are obvious. Where would China sit? How would the US be classified, given its global posture? And what about Taiwan? Who would be relegated to Tier Two? And what would the criteria be for inclusion in Tier One — financial aid, alignment with Pacific priorities, or military might?

These aren’t simply technical questions — they’re steeped in geopolitics and sensitivities.

They also reveal something larger: partnerships rather than Pacific priorities continue to define the shape of regionalism.

Partners everywhere

Beyond the Pacific Islands Forum, partners are deeply entrenched in every layer of Pacific regionalism. They sit inside regional institutions, dominate multilateral engagements, and shape bilateral arrangements. Increasingly, in some countries, they effectively exercise sovereign rights through exclusive security agreements, using aid as leverage.

Labour mobility is another example. New Zealand’s RSE and Australia’s PALM schemes are now critical pillars of many Pacific economies, despite their challenges. For Pacific families, mobility pathways are seen as a way out — the chance of a better life. Climate change adds urgency, but the motivation runs deeper: given the opportunity, many would move. We see this clearly with Tuvalu, with nearly one-third of its residents applying for climate visas under the Falepili agreement with Australia.

So, what does this tell us? One can argue that partners — and in particular, our so-called “partners of choice” — already drive the regional agenda. Both within and outside of the Pacific Islands Forum, they wield significant influence, from formal political groupings to the daily realities of the Pacific people.

For Melanesian and Polynesian states at least, Australia and New Zealand are already the “partners of choice” by virtue of geography, historical ties, and the size of their Pacific diasporas.

But the thing with having the inside running is that the more you keep looking over your shoulder, the more likely you are to stumble. The use of the phrase “partners of choice” by Australia and New Zealand signals insecurity and a more transactional approach to the region.

And this only strengthens the resolve of Pacific nations to seek an alternative space to meet among themselves. After all, the Pacific Islands Forum itself was born 54 years ago out of those very sentiments.

Informal workarounds: A Pacific way

Pacific nations understand their structural realities, and they have learned to work with them. They know the limitations of the Pacific Islands Forum, but they also know that it serves a critical purpose — not least as a mechanism for engaging directly with Australia and New Zealand.

But Pacific nations also know that sometimes they need to work around the power imbalances and compromises. In the absence of a Pacific-only structure in the region, they’ve relied on informal coalitions. Vanuatu, for example, carefully mobilised a coalition of support for the ICJ climate change advisory opinion before bringing it back into the Forum for endorsement. The Vanuatu-Tuvalu Fossil Free Non-Proliferation Treaty initiative is another example.

This reliance on informal spaces isn’t a weakness. In many ways, it reflects the “Pacific way” in action: adaptable, pragmatic, and resourceful. It shows how, even in compromised waters, the region can chart a path.

Sione Tekiteki is a senior lecturer at the Auckland University of Technology Law School. He was previously the director of governance and engagement at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. He has over 20 years of experience in the Pacific, in the fields of international relations and regional governance.

E-Tangata, 2025