Cook Islands PM Mark Brown, left, and New Zealand’s foreign affairs minister Winston Peters in Rarotonga, in February 2024. (Photo: RNZ Pacific/Eleisha Foon)
The recent diplomatic spat between New Zealand and the Cook Islands may come down to differing interpretations of “consultation”. But, to many in the Pacific, New Zealand’s handling reeks of neocolonial paternalism, writes Professor Steven Ratuva.
From the vantage point of the New Zealand government, the Cook Islands government’s proposal for its own passport and its deal with China, without “consultation”, may constitute an act tantamount to juvenile delinquency.
On the other hand, many see New Zealand’s stance as reeking of neocolonial paternalism.
New Zealand threatened to withdraw the use of the New Zealand passport by Cook Islanders if the Cook Islands passport is issued. Winston Peters, New Zealand’s foreign minister, also blasted Mark Brown, the Cook Islands prime minister, saying that his government had failed to consult New Zealand about the deal with China.
This concern about Chinese hegemony is not new. It’s been a swirling geostrategic narrative in Oceania and has been part of New Zealand’s “Pacific reset” approach in the past.
However, what is of concern to New Zealand is Mark Brown’s foreign policy direction and his eagerness to engage with China on significant economic and development issues without consultation.
Opinions are divided among Cook Islanders, about 20,000 of whom live in the islands, with another 100,000 based in New Zealand.
Opposition among the Cook Islanders, spearheaded by the opposition party, stem from what they see as the government’s lack of consultation with the local population.
They’re also wary of attempts to disturb the relationship with New Zealand, which they’ve enjoyed and benefited from, for a long time. There have been street protests and a parliamentary vote of no confidence in the prime minister has been filed.
The ripples have widened into debates around statehood and sovereignty, and how much the Cook Islands’ democratically elected government can or can’t do as it plots its developmental and diplomatic strategies in an everchanging region and world.
Free association and autonomy
The Cook Islands’ status as a “self-governing territory in free association” with New Zealand is set out in the country’s 1964 constitution. It provides for “New Zealand citizenship” and New Zealand’s “responsibilities . . . for external affairs and defence . . . to be discharged after consultation by the Prime Minister of New Zealand with the Premier of the Cook Islands.”
Over succeeding decades, the situation has changed significantly in terms of the internal political dynamics in the Cook Islands, mass migration of Cook Islanders, the emergence of a large diaspora community, an increase in international connectivity and tourism, and participation in Pacific regionalism as well as engagement in international organisations and global geopolitics.
The Cook Islands is now a member of regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community and other regional entities. It enjoys the full privileges of a sovereign state, except for two main features of full autonomy and sovereignty: a passport and representation in the United Nations.
In a way, the 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration, which outlined the relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, was cognisant of these ongoing changes.
Signed by Sir Terepai Maoate for the Cook Islands and Helen Clark for New Zealand, it affirmed in Clause 7 that the Cook Islands “has full legal and executive competence in respect of its own defence and security.”
It’s important to note here that New Zealand’s role, according to the agreement, is to “assist” in these matters “as may be requested from time to time by the Government of Cook Islands.”
Furthermore, Clause 5 of the declaration states that the Cook Islands “possesses the capacity to enter into treaties and other international agreements in its own right with other governments and regional and international organisations.”
Thus, in both clauses, it appears at first glance that there is no strictly binding obligation on the part of the Cook Islands to be told by New Zealand what it should or should not do. Rather, the agreement merely spells out the need for consultation as a gesture of trust, respect and partnership.
It appears that the current differences between the two parties are based on the divergent interpretations of the constitutional term “consultation”, which, interestingly, is absent from the 2001 agreement.
So, is Mark Brown’s refusal to consult with New Zealand a deliberate signal and step towards full autonomy?
The question of political autonomy in this case is not straightforward. For instance, the issues of a new passport and membership of the UN, which have been raised in recent years, may require a referendum. In addition, the constitutional provisions of “free association” status, which still gives New Zealand a say in the affairs of the Cook Islands, such as security and defence, will need to be amended.
The power to make all these changes lies with the people of the Cook Islands, and any referendum will need to be properly negotiated beforehand with New Zealand. For instance, should the threshold be 50 percent or two-thirds? As we’ve seen in the case of the self-determination referendum for Tokelau in 2007, the two-thirds threshold was difficult to achieve, although more than 50 percent voted “yes”.
The question is: Are the Cook Islands constitution and the 2001 agreement in line with the changes in the broader political environment and the perceptions of the Cook Islands people?
The solution lies in engaging in a mutual talanoa in an atmosphere of trust and goodwill to arrive at an amicable solution. The discussions could range from security policy issues to total autonomy.
“Although most Pacific Island states have signed bilateral deals with China in the past, what makes the Cook Islands deal significant is the tense and anxiety-filled geopolitical situation in the region.” Pictured: Cook Islands PM Mark Brown with Dr Zhaoxu Ma, Executive Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, in Rarotonga in December 2024. (Facebook post from the PM’s office)
The China deal and its regional implications
The bilateral agreement between China and the Cook Islands is far more complex and, in some aspects, controversial.
While the Action Plan 2025-2030 for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Cook Islands and the People’s Republic of China covers a range of “normal” bilateral issues — such as economic cooperation, infrastructure, climate resilience, disaster preparedness, health and education — the heart of the deal are detailed in the three MOUs on economic and technical cooperation, exploitation of marine resources and deep sea mining.
While these align well with the Cook Islands government’s interest in deep sea mining, the danger is that the MOUs give China the licence for almost unrestricted access to the marine and deep sea mining resources of the Cook Islands.
Although most Pacific Island states have signed bilateral deals with China in the past, what makes the Cook Islands deal significant is the tense and anxiety-filled geopolitical situation in the region. China’s live military exercises in the last few days in the Tasman Sea, emboldened by Donald Trump’s unravelling and weakening of the US’s global military might, could be a signal of more Chinese sabre rattling in our region.
But let’s be sober and nuanced about this.
Pacific countries have learned to deal with China and the western powers strategically in the past, and they will continue to perfect their diplomatic art. China’s attempt in 2022 to sign a multilateral deal with the members of the Pacific Islands Forum failed after countries collectively pushed back on China’s ambitious imperial plans. Instead, individual countries signed bilateral agreements with China, based on a mutually agreed developmental focus.
But Pacific countries may increasingly find the Chinese goodies more attractive because of the behaviour of western countries. There was great hope when Pacific leaders accepted President Joe Biden’s invitation to Washington in 2022, where they signed the US Pacific Partnership Strategy. Part of the deal was that the US would provide $US800 million for 10 years, but, three years later, this has not eventuated.
Worse still is the fact that Trump, Biden’s successor, doesn’t care about the Pacific and has suspended USAID, the only visible US soft power engagement in the region. Who knows, he might even try to rename the Pacific “Ocean of America.”
The unfulfilled promises of the Biden deal and Trump’s reversal of the US’s climate change commitment through its withdrawal from COP, have diminished the credibility of the US as a trusted partner among Pacific countries.
“The unfulfilled promises of the Biden deal and Trump’s reversal of the US’s climate change commitment through its withdrawal from COP, have diminished the credibility of the US as a trusted partner among Pacific countries.” Pictured, Pacific leaders with President Joe Biden in Washington, September 2022. (Photo: Bonnie Cash/UPI/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
In almost the same way, New Zealand’s moral force and mana in the region has also been overshadowed by the coalition government’s assault on climate change, the major existential human security issue in the Pacific.
Winston Peters’ controversial statement during the Pacific Island Leaders Forum in Tonga in 2024, which downplayed the significance of human-made climate change, made things worse. For Pacific peoples, who have lived with and adapted to the impacts of climate change for years, these have raised questions about New Zealand’s trustworthiness as a regional partner.
By and large, these issues have led to a sense of betrayal and disappointment with the western powers. As a result, we’ve seen Pacific countries becoming more assertive, and questioning the regional order that has kept them subservient to the whims of Australia, New Zealand and the US since the Cold War.
This compels them to seek alternative partnerships, and China seems, in their eyes, an attractive option. It’s the geopolitical game-theory approach of playing competing powers against each other for maximum return.
We shouldn’t, therefore, be surprised at the behaviour of Kiribati and the Cook Islands in blatantly ignoring New Zealand’s overtures. Others could also follow.
It’s still possible to regain this lost mana through more people-to-people and culture-to-culture engagement, similar to former foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta’s “resilient” approach.
Rather than using megaphone diplomacy and neocolonial paternalism, New Zealand and Australia need to re-examine their subconscious stereotypes of Pacific people. They need to craft strategic approaches that are people-to-people based, in line with Pacific cultural norms. And they need to ask if they have insulted leaders and people in ways they’re not aware of.
A cultural aspect that they need to understand is that silence and lack of pushback doesn’t mean compliance and passive acceptance. Silence is often used as a defensive mechanism to deflect and absorb. There is a strand of regional thinking that western powers are self-interested geopolitical chessboard manipulators, using Pacific Island states to serve their anti-China strategic interests. China is also seen in the same way.
However, Pacific Island states see this as an opportunity. Not to blindly align with China, as often propagated by some, but as part of genuine attempts to diversify economic and diplomatic partnerships, which benefit them.
Pacific countries and territories trying to assert their sense of autonomy need to be treated with respect and mana, and not be growled at in a paternalistic way, as if they’re delinquent juveniles.
Steven Ratuva is an award-winning interdisciplinary Fijian scholar. He is Distinguished Professor and Pro-Vice Chancellor Pacific at the University of Canterbury, and the director of the Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies. He also chairs the International Political Science Association research committee on climate security and planetary politics, and has other international, regional and national research leadership roles. (The opinions expressed in these articles don’t express the views of the University of Canterbury.)
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Thank you, Professor Ratuva, for such a comprehensive and interesting analysis of the current ‘stoush’ between NZ and the Cook Islands.
NZ’s “responsibilities… for the external affairs and defence of the Cook Islands” set out in the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 were effectively modified by the Joint Centenary Declaration signed between NZ and the Cook Islands in 2001. It appears as if the NZ government has yet to catch up with the provisions of that Declaration. Or that NZ signed something whose implications it did not, and still does not, fully understand.
For example, Clause 4 (Foreign Affairs) states that “In the conduct of its foreign affairs, the Cook Islands interacts with the international community as a sovereign and independent state.”
And then, “Any action taken by New Zealand in respect of its constitutional responsibilities for the foreign affairs of the Cook Islands will be taken on the delegated authority, and as an agent or facilitator at the specific request of, the Cook Islands. Section 5 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 thus records a responsibility to assist the Cook Islands and not a qualification of Cook Islands’ statehood.”
Yes, the word ‘consult’ crops up regularly, but there is no binding obligation on the part of the Cook Islands to consult NZ before (if at all) the Cook Islands enters into any agreement with another state.
So, as the Cook Islands now conducts itself as a “sovereign and independent state”, it is presumably time for the Cook Islands to become exactly that and shed the ‘self-governing in free association’ constitutional relationship it has had with NZ since 1965.
It does not make sense for the Cook Islands to be both independent and yet remain in the constitutional relationship within which it has existed as part of the “Realm of New Zealand’.
Passports are not the key issue here. Passports are a downstream implication of sovereignty and independence. Passports signify the holder’s right to the citizenship of an independent state. There are significant constitutional steps that would need to be taken before Cook Island passports (signalling Cook Islands citizenship) could be issued. And they are (1) the creation in law of the Cook Islands as a sovereign, independent state, and (2) the creation in law of Cook Islands citizenship.
It may be that NZ got ahead of itself in the 2001 Declaration, and that it is paternalistically hogtied in constitutional arrangements that predated it.
What matters now, however, is whether the Cook Islands wishes to sever the constitutional tie that it has traditionally maintained with NZ. Because, on the one hand, the Cook Islands cannot have a dollar each way on this one, and, on the other, NZ cannot stand in the way of the Cook Islands’ desire to now operate as a sovereign and independent state – if there is such a desire.
There will clearly be implications for the Cook Islands if it wishes to quit its current constitutional relationship with NZ. Freedom of access to NZ and to NZ public services, like education and health, and employment, would be three of those implications. In those and other respects, the Cook Islands could be well advised to consider the post-independence relationship between (formerly Western) Samoa and NZ.
Every New Zealander should read this analysis. If they were able to do that the New Zealand government would be obliged to adopt an intelligent approach to its relations with its Pacific neighbours. Congratulations to E Tangata and Dr Ratuva on the best analysis I have seen on the political background to the Cook Islands fracas.
Outstanding analysis, apart from the claim of “Chinese Imperialism”. What empire? What military bases? What coups?