A more principled approach to Palestine

New Zealand prides itself on taking a principled and independent approach to foreign policy. Our national identity is partly built on being perceived as a good global citizen, standing up for human rights, and being a principled actor in international affairs.

There are important moments in our recent history which bolster this perception. Namely, our response to the nuclear activities of France and the US in the South Pacific in the 1970s and ‘80s, and our resistance to apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s.

However, as John Hobbs argues here, the evidence suggests that New Zealand hasn’t been consistent or principled in its approach to Palestine and Israel.

 

What is Aotearoa New Zealand’s foreign policy approach to the occupation of Palestine by Israel, and what drives our choices?

As I argue here, the denial of our own settler colonial history provides a clue to how we approach the question of self-determination of the Palestinian people. That approach can best be described as consistently passive while trying to give the (false) impression that we’re doing something positive.

A ‘conflict’? Really?

The first point I’d like to make is that the term “conflict” is often used to describe the situation between Palestine and Israel. This term wrongly implies an equivalence between the two “parties” to the dispute. This could not be further from the truth. Israel is the sovereign occupier of what was once Palestine.

Following the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948 and the Six-Day War in 1967, where Israel seized control of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, it has operated with complete military control, backed by the US, to enforce its occupation.

This lack of equivalence has been most evident over the past year, with the US providing military arms and intelligence to support the “plausible” genocide (as the International Court of Justice described it in January, 2024) of the Palestinian people in Gaza.

Israel is an apartheid state — a state for the Jewish people only, which is enshrined in its legislation. In the Basic Laws of Israel, which set out the legal foundations of the state, the basic principles of this apartheid are laid out:

“. . .the land of Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people; the State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people and the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish people.”

In short, there is no room for the Palestinian people as equals in Palestine, with all that follows from being subject to an apartheid Israeli regime.

Aotearoa’s foreign policy approach

It has become apparent that our foreign policy towards the genocide is, at best, weak and largely insincere. It’s a policy carefully crafted to give the appearance of helping to end what foreign affairs minister Winston Peters describes as the “utter catastrophe” in Gaza. But in reality, its purpose is to align with our Anglosphere allies — the US, the UK, Canada and Australia.

The Israeli military intervention in Gaza after October 7 has become one of the defining moral foreign policy issues of our age, not unlike apartheid South Africa in the 1980s. The approach of western states to the ongoing Israeli attack on Gaza has been heavily criticised by civilians and the human rights and humanitarian entities of the UN.

That Aotearoa New Zealand and its allies have consistently failed to hold Israel to account, in the way that they’ve sought to hold Russia to account for its invasion of Ukraine, seriously undermines the credibility of the international order. By not “calling out” the evident genocide, Aotearoa is compromising its independence, not least its responsibilities under the Convention on Genocide and its ethical responsibilities to the Palestinian people.

At the beginning of 2023, I completed a master’s thesis that explored Aotearoa’s approach to the enduring occupation of Palestine. I wanted to examine why Aotearoa’s actions did not consistently align with its so-called principled and independent values.

This inconsistency is most obvious when comparing Aotearoa’s actions in the UN with those in the domestic sphere. The UN offers a performative opportunity for Aotearoa to be seen to act as a good international citizen. Outside this setting, other factors are influential, including our settler colonial history, the Anglosphere, and local interests. Taken together, Aotearoa’s approach falls well short. It’s not possible to be principled and independent in one setting and the opposite in another.

Aotearoa frames its response to Palestine as one that supports the peace process and the two-state solution, a process established in 1993 with the Oslo Accords. This language has arguably been adopted to support Aotearoa’s broader geopolitical interests: it falls in line with its Anglosphere partners, but also underscores its social identity as a good global citizen committed to resolving the “conflict.”

Our inconsistent approach and its influences

In 1947, New Zealand supported a United Nations General Assembly resolution to divide historic Palestine into two separate states, one Israeli and one Palestinian.

This resolution went against the will of the Palestinian people, who owned 95 percent of the land and comprised 70 percent of the population. New Zealand effectively watched as Jewish paramilitary groups entered Palestine and ethnically cleansed its people from their land. More than 500 Palestinian villages were destroyed and 700,000 people were forced out of their country under the British and UN watch. New Zealand then supported Israel’s declaration of independence and admittance to the UN in 1949.

In 1974, however, New Zealand supported a UN invitation to Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, to address the General Assembly. Our close allies either voted against the resolution (the US) or stayed neutral.

In 2012, we supported a General Assembly resolution to upgrade Palestine to non-member observer state status. Our Anglosphere partners either voted against the resolution (US and Canada) or abstained (Australia and the UK).

Finally, during our tenure on the UN Security Council (in 2015 and 2016), New Zealand successfully co-sponsored a resolution to keep alive the two-state solution. It unequivocally condemned Israel’s settlements in the Palestinian territories.

The resolution reaffirmed that:

“. . .the establishment of settlements, including East Jerusalem, occupied since 1967 has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.”

When it came time to vote, 14 members voted in favour (including New Zealand), no members voted against, and the US abstained. The Security Council had reached a formal decision on the settlements only twice before this moment, the last time being some 40 years before in 1980.

More recently, in September 2024, New Zealand supported a General Assembly resolution which:

“. . .demands that Israel brings to an end without delay its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which constitutes a wrongful act of a continuing character entailing its international responsibility, and do so no later than 12 months from the adoption of the present resolution.”

In summary, Aotearoa New Zealand has, from time to time, differentiated itself at key moments from its Anglosphere allies.

However, in the domestic sphere, our actions aren’t proactive and place no pressure on Israel or the international community to end the occupation.

For example, following the Security Council resolution in 2015–16, Aotearoa hasn’t implemented the requirement for member states to distinguish in their dealings between products produced by Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem and the rest of Israel.

This effectively gives a green light to all companies here to trade with illegal Israeli settler colonies. The ASB has been criticised for investing in Motorola, which operates in the West Bank settlements. While ASB is reviewing its position, some of its clients have taken their business elsewhere in protest.

Interviews with politicians and diplomats

To understand why Aotearoa has been so reticent, I interviewed a small number of ministers of the Crown, diplomats and independent researchers who all had direct experience in foreign policy, defence, and security.

I was keen to understand the real influences behind government decision-making on Palestine. These individuals weren’t passive observers in the foreign policy process, rather they were actively involved in its development and implementation. To protect the interviewees from unwarranted public criticism (particularly from the Israeli lobby) and to encourage an open as possible discussion, the names of the interviewees had to remain anonymous. This was a requirement of the university’s ethical approval process.

The interviews occurred in 2022, before the incursion of Hamas into Israel on October 7, 2023, where over 1200 Israelis were killed. Since that date, more than 43,000 Palestinian people have been killed, a large proportion of those being Palestinian children. While the interviews took place before October 7, they remain pertinent. All participants were well aware of the history of the occupation of Palestine and the ongoing Israeli military incursions into Gaza and the occupied West Bank, which has resulted in a staggering loss of Palestinian lives.

What became clear from our discussions was that while the factors influencing New Zealand’s foreign policy response to the illegal occupation are diverse, its identification with its Anglosphere partners (particularly the US) plays a significant role in its foreign policy choices. Some argued that the foreign policy choices it makes reflect a “neo-orientalist” set of assumptions that construct the Palestinian as “other”, rather than who we are.

Several interviewees found it useful to frame the Palestinian experience as one of settler colonialism, likening it to New Zealand’s own colonial history. One interviewee commented that the conflict is a settler colonial situation, and that if the Israeli occupation had happened in the 18th century, no one would have “blinked an eye”. However, the prevailing racist assumptions that underpinned historical colonisation, such as in New Zealand, are arguably harder to sustain today.

When speaking of the Israeli colonisation of historical Palestine, the interviewee commented:

“It’s about land and racism. If you are pushing someone off their land, you have to believe that you have a greater right, a belief that you are superior, [with] a greater ability to utilise the land. It’s the most egregious example of [the] western white world’s racism and aggression towards Muslims and people of colour.” (Independent researcher and activist.)

Another interviewee referred to Israel’s settler colonialism “with a difference”, namely, that:

“While the Israeli claim of being indigenous is absurd, there is a genuine Jewish connection to the place. And from a New Zealand point of view, we need to be honest about our own history and be able to see both its positive and negative aspects.” (Independent researcher.)

One politician, when describing the situation, said:

“There is definitely an element of colonialism, an element of apartheid, an element of straight-out racism, and utter arrogance that international law doesn’t hold equally to both sides.”

The interviewee further commented that:

“We gravitate to people who look like us. In this case, Israel’s desire to be seen as European; and in contrast, Palestinian spokespeople look and sound foreign. This does influence our foreign policy.”

Of course, this begs the question of who “us” is in this statement — the politician clearly wasn’t referring to tangata whenua. Another academic pointed to the deep racist assumptions that are prevalent against the Palestinians, where part of the prevailing narrative has been the uncritical assumption that “all Arabs are terrorists”.

Similar racist sentiments, expressed against Muslim people in New Zealand, were identified in discussions with the Muslim community after the terrorist attack on the two mosques in Christchurch. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch Terrorist Attack made the comment that:

“Nearly everyone we met believed that tackling racism and prejudice would make New Zealand safer [and that] the root of this hatred must be shaken. Racism can be eliminated including through the media. Peaceful messages should be delivered.” (Report of Royal Commission, 2020)

And there is also the language of the “conflict” and how Aotearoa publicly constructs its foreign policy approach. One interviewee, when reflecting on the use of the diplomatic language of MFAT officials — which included terms or phrases such as “principled”, “balanced”, “leave it to the parties to resolve the conflict”, or “supporting the peace process” — commented:

 “This is a clever formula of words which bridge inconsistencies and make a dumb policy sound principled, and then they hang on to their words through thick and thin. The mentality that is often seen in the use of language is to make everything all right — the adoption of tactical language to justify the unjustifiable; and often to do nothing to serve a purpose.” (Independent researcher.)

One interviewee, an ex-diplomat, questioned which “principles” precisely New Zealand was applying to the situation, and in this context pointed out that “the Israeli military occupation is in plain sight for anyone to see if they want to look”.

The same interviewee made the comment that the use of the term “principled” was “diplomatic speak and means nothing.” They pointed out that:

“‘Supporting the peace process’ is that neutral position which means you are not part of our agenda (that is, the parties to the conflict) and we don’t expect to change anything, and we are not going to try.”

One politician commented that it’s often considered best to say nothing in response to an event related to the conflict, that is, to “let sleeping dogs lie”, in order to protect other interests. However:

“Where it is not possible to say nothing, and New Zealand is confronted by, for example, the bombing of Gaza, or Israeli spies being caught in New Zealand, and one is compelled to say something, lean into what’s happening and say you are horrified. But don’t do too much, and hope that it will go away, because you don’t want to upset the US.”

In the context of the use of the terms “balanced” or “even-handed”, one interviewee (a politician) said that it was tiring to have the genocide presented by New Zealand as, “on the one hand Palestine and on the other hand Israel, as if there is some symmetric conflict. Which it’s not!” The interviewee was referring to the vast difference in the relative power of the two parties. The interviewee said that there is a “real detachment between knowing what’s happening, and seeing it, and then talking about a values-driven foreign policy, and not doing much about it”.

Another politician said that the use of language was designed to avoid offending anyone:

“New Zealand has not wanted to get in a fight without a definite benefit. While there is no particular political capital in being aligned with Israel, over time and until recently, it has been an Anglosphere western block thing to do. However, we have trade interests with the Middle East, so saying we are ‘principled and balanced’ seems like a good place to be.”

What might a more principled approach look like?

This then begs the question of what a more “principled” approach to foreign policy might look like. Would a decolonised approach to foreign policy lead to a more sympathetic and principled approach by Aotearoa to international affairs?

In trying to grapple with this question, the first point would be to recognise Māori as a sovereign partner with the Crown. This would mean Māori are engaged with the Crown as equals in the construction of foreign policy.

To date, Māori have been relegated to the margins of international engagement. Robert Mahuta and Manuka Henare argue that Māori have had a longstanding interest and engagement in foreign policy through extensive trade arrangements in pre-European and early settler history. They see this lack of inclusion and recognition of Māori as an equal partner in foreign policy development as a fundamental misrepresentation of the Treaty relationship, the principles of equal participation, and a failure on the part of the Crown.

Maria Bargh, when discussing Māori involvement in foreign policy, argues that it is necessary to return to the issue of sovereignty and how power is shared between Māori and the Crown. She points out that the Crown “assumes total and indivisible control over foreign policy. Māori are only involved/consulted as a token measure.”

Tracey McIntosh argues that it’s important that Māori see themselves (individually and collectively) and their aspirations reflected in foreign policy. Indeed, she queries whether it is legitimate to engage in international relations while not recognising the Indigenous people within it.

The second point is to acknowledge the history of Aotearoa, where the features of settler colonialism in Aotearoa are well-documented, characterised by invasion and war against Māori, displacement of Māori from their land, and an ongoing set of institutional arrangements that don’t reflect the Māori understanding of what was recognised by the Crown in He Whakaputanga and Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

The third point is that a truly principled approach would draw on core human values where the rights of all peoples are given priority over narrow economic and strategic interests, including traditional alliances. It’s not a coincidence that Aotearoa has moved in lockstep with our Anglosphere allies over their endorsement of the genocide in Gaza through silence and military support. What we’re seeing in Gaza mirrors our own settler colonial history and its dominant white Anglo identity. That history and identity don’t relate easily to the Muslim/Middle Eastern/Arab ”other”.

One politician commented:

“Material interests almost always take precedence over human rights but can overlap when human rights atrocities threaten our regional security, international trade/monetary markets, or when our support of allies who commit human rights violations threatens our international reputation.”

The National-led coalition government has been rapidly rolling out a range of policy initiatives aimed at embedding a “one New Zealand’’ identity and erasing a Treaty-based bicultural identity. The Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill, the revision of the education curriculum to return to a narrow view of Aotearoa’s history, and the abolition of the Māori Health Authority (Te Aka Whai Ora) are just a few examples of this.

There are, however, recent examples of approaching foreign policy differently.

The previous Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanaia Mahuta, drew on the unique Māori-Crown relationship by centring her foreign policy approach in Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Mahuta chose “the principles of partnership and mutual respect embodied in the Treaty” to provide the foundation for how Aotearoa can conduct its foreign policy. She chose values such as manaaki (kindness or the reciprocity of goodwill), whanaunga (our connectedness or shared sense of humanity), mahi tahi and kotahitanga (collective benefits and shared aspiration), and kaitiaki (protectors and stewards of our intergenerational wellbeing).

I refer to this approach as the “Mahuta doctrine” to underscore its uniqueness and distinguish it from what came before (and what has come since). Might this doctrine provide a more constructive and principled base for the development of Aotearoa foreign policy?

While Mahuta’s approach doesn’t go as far as asserting Māori rights as a sovereign partner alongside the Crown under Te Tiriti, it does centre its approach on the principles of Te Tiriti, and thus goes some way to advance a more inclusive Indigenous approach to foreign policy.

In the case of the Israeli genocide in Gaza (underpinned by support from the west), such an approach would likely be more supportive of Palestinian rights as embedded in international and humanitarian law.

Aotearoa needs to take a principled stand, drawing on a recognition of its own settler history and identification with the erasure being experienced by Palestinian people — and the moments when Aotearoa challenged dominant power interests in the Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s.

This would signal a break in policy within the Anglosphere, which would not go unnoticed — and which just might make a positive difference in how the west approaches the Palestinian desire for self-determination.

 

John Hobbs has been a career public servant, working in a number of government departments (most recently the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet). He also worked for a number of Ministers on secondment from government agencies. He has a Master of Commerce (Hons) in Economics from the University of Auckland and a Master of Arts (Thesis) with Distinction in Peace and Conflict Studies, from the University of Otago. He is currently undertaking a PhD at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Te Tumu School of Māori, Pacific and Indigenous Studies, Otago University.

E-Tangata, 2024